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Summary 
This thesis looks at investments in low-risk assets denominated in foreign currencies and 
discusses theoretical implications related to the findings. Specifically, it looks at Japanese 
yen (JPY) and US dollars (USD). 
Chapter 1 provides some background information about the phenomenon called carry 
trade, which has been mentioned in the public debate about economic affairs in general and 
exchange rate movements in particular. Since the term carry trade is often used in a vague or 
undefined manner, I start out by gathering some information from various sources in order to 
present a short overview of what carry trade actually is. This is done in the first part of 
Chapter 1. I then continue by describing some aspects of the Japanese financial market in 
order to justify the choice of Japanese yen and US dollars for the empirical study made in the 
thesis. 
 In the main part of Chapter 1, I go on to check whether uncovered interest parity 
(relating interest rates and expected exchange rate changes) are supported using the data on 
Japanese yen and US dollars. I then proceed to explore if there was a forward discount bias 
in the period 1993 to 2008 in order to look at uncovered interest parity from another angle. 
This is done by removing currency exchange risk through the use of forward contracts. 
My empirical findings do not support uncovered interest parity. In fact, the results are 
opposite of what the uncovered interest parity hypothesis suggests. In the case of uncovered 
interest parity, I find that when a currency gave a higher interest return than another, this 
tended to lead to an increase rather than a decrease in the value of the same currency over the 
same period. I also find that although shorter three-year periods within the 1993-2008 period 
exhibited mixed results, uncovered investments in USD three-month bonds tended to yield 
higher return over the longer 1993-2008 period when compared to similar uncovered three-
month bond investments in JPY. 
I find that covered investments in Japanese yen gave higher return than similar 
investments in US dollars. This result is robust in the sense that it applied to the observed 
period 1993-2008 as a whole, and also to shorter three-year time-spans within this period. 
This shows that the forward rate was distorted, or biased. I relate this to the forward discount 
bias which has been described in economic literature. 
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In the last part of Chapter 1, I discuss potential reasons for these findings and 
compare the findings to other studies by reviewing some of the literature in this field. I also 
look at the development of the Japanese financial market from the 1980s. That review 
indicates that although the Japanese financial market may have been less liquid in the past 
than the US market, deregulations and reforms have made the markets more similar. 
 Chapter 2 of the thesis goes a step further into a theoretical paradox called the Siegel 
paradox. The Siegel paradox describes investments in foreign currencies and predicts a 
forward discount bias. I study the Siegel paradox for currency movements by using a 
simplified example with USD and JPY. The rationale leading to the paradox is analyzed, and 
alternative ways of thinking are investigated by looking at a simple version of the two-
envelope problem. I try to find similarities and differences between the Siegel paradox and 
the two-envelope problem in order to gain some insight into what may be the common cause 
of the two paradoxes. I find that Jensen’s inequality applies to both paradoxes. I find that the 
lack of a total value in the Siegel paradox and the existence of such a total value in the two-
envelope problem may be one of the important differences between the two problems. 
In Chapter 3, I discuss the relevance of the findings related to the paradoxes in 
Chapter 2 to interest rate parity and the forward discount bias found in Chapter 1. I suggest 
that the Siegel paradox is a purely theoretical misstatement which does not explain the 
forward discount bias observed in the market. Rather, I suggest that the forward discount 
bias is the result of other rational choices made by investors, like a risk premium and risk 
aversion among the investors combined with tax differences, trading costs and differences in 
liquidity. I suggest that investors that base their investment choices on the Siegel paradox are 
probably allocating their capital in an inefficient manner. 
Finally, I indicate that further investigation should be made into resolving the Siegel 
paradox as this could possibly lead to a deeper understanding of risk, return and capital 
allocation in the financial markets. 
 The data in this thesis have been retrieved from the websites of the Bank of Japan 
and the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The spreadsheet application Microsoft Office 
Excel has been used for the processing of data and for the regressions. 
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1. Interest Rate Parity 
In this chapter I start by looking at carry trade, which is an issue that comes up in the media 
from time to time. Since the term is often used quite loosely, I mention some possible 
definitions and data from reliable sources in order to get an overview of the phenomenon. I 
then look at some aspects of the Japanese financial markets in order to get an understanding 
of how it works. In order to see if the phenomenon of carry trade may be profitable, I spend 
the main part of this chapter checking if uncovered interest parity has held for three-month 
maturity bonds in the US and Japan. I also check if the forward rate has been an unbiased 
estimator of the future exchange rate. I use separate regression analyses for the two 
currencies in order to shed light on the Siegel paradox and two envelope problem in Chapter 
2 (where the importance of the numéraire is investigated). In Chapter 1, I also discuss 
potential reasons for the findings I have made. I then continue by looking at some aspects of 
the Japanese economy in the 1980s and onward in order to understand why investment flows 
have been so large out of Japan and into currencies like the US dollar. By discussing the 
quality of the data, I make some suggestions about how to improve the analysis that has been 
made. In the end of the chapter, I review some literature about interest rate parity and try to 
relate the results that I have found to these papers. 
  
1.1 Carry Trade 
During the last few decades, two of the most widely traded currencies in the world have been 
the US dollar and the Japanese yen. These currencies are used in the largest (USA) and the 
second largest (Japan) national economies in the world as measured by nominal GDP
1
. 
During the last few years, some attention has been given to the phenomenon called carry 
trade. The reason is that movements in the currency exchange rates tend to trigger 
withdrawals of leveraged investments in foreign currency assets. This may further affect 
currency exchange rates and other prices. 
 
Definitions of carry trade 
There are several possible ways of defining carry trade. Some consider carry trade in the 
narrow sense of the term to be the act of borrowing in a currency with low interest rates to 
                                                 
1
 Gross Domestic Product (current prices, in USD) for 2007 from the International Monetary Fund 
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fund deposits in a high-interest yielding currency. Others may consider any financial 
transaction that increases one‟s high-yielding assets relative to one‟s low-yielding assets to 
be carry trade
2
. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines
3
 carry trade in the following way: “A 
leveraged transaction in which borrowed funds are used to take a position in which the 
expected return exceeds the cost of the borrowed funds.” 
One can also separate between different types of investors. Financial investors may 
invest in the hope of increasing their financial return while commercial investors may act 
with the aim of protecting their business activities from losses. 
 
Examples of carry trade 
One example of carry trade is investments through the exchange of Japanese yen (JPY, 
which for a long time have offered low interest rates) into US dollars (USD, which for a long 
time have offered considerably higher interest rates). When looking at the short-term impact 
on currency exchange rates, it may be important to differentiate between investments derived 
from borrowed yen (leveraging) and investments based on savings or surplus liquidity. The 
latter will not normally set off large sell-offs when the exchange rate moves as there is no 
need to withdraw the investments in order to repay loans. 
Because the rest of the world has large net liabilities in Japanese yen, one can expect 
that many investors are willing to protect themselves against yen appreciation. 
If the JPY have been borrowed, then the loans may be subject to conditions that are 
shaped in order to ensure that the borrowers will be able to repay the borrowed yen. These 
lending conditions could force the investors to reduce or liquidate their holdings of USD 
assets and exchange the USD back into JPY if their value (measured in yen) falls below a 
certain threshold. This is often referred to as unwinding of carry trade. This has typically 
taken place when the JPY has suddenly strengthened compared to foreign currencies, but it 
could also happen because of large declines in the foreign currency value of particular assets. 
Borrowing JPY and investing in USD means going short in JPY (betting that the 
value of the Japanese yen will decrease) and going long in USD (betting that the value of the 
US dollar assets will increase). 
Hedge funds and to some extent pension funds, investment banks and individual 
investors, are among the market participants that engage in carry trade. As a net foreign asset 
                                                 
2
 Gagnon and Chaboud (2007) 
3
 IMF (2007b, 102) 
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holder with a net long position in foreign assets, the Japanese official sector could (in the 
wider definition of the term) be said to be heavily engaged in carry trade. Japan‟s official 
reserve assets surpassed USD 1000 billion in February 2008 to become USD 1015.6 billion
4
 
at the end of March 2008. 97 percent of this was foreign currency reserves. This is the 
second largest stock of foreign currency assets in the world after China. 
 
Capital export and import 
According to the IMF
5, Japan accounted for 12.2 percent of countries‟ net export of capital 
in 2006 as measured by countries‟ current account surplus. The largest net importer of 
capital was USA, accounting for an estimated 63.7 percent of capital imports. These figures 
indicate that Japan is a major exporter and the US a major target for investment flows. 
Henceforth, looking at the case of JPY and USD seems to be justified. 
 
1.2 The Scope of Carry Trade 
When investors make investment choices, they also choose which currencies to invest in and 
borrow in. For small investors, it is often easier to invest in assets denominated in their 
country’s own currency than to invest in assets denominated in other currencies. However, 
for people, institutions and firms with more resources, the trading costs as a proportion of the 
value of the assets they hold will be small or insignificant. They may also have costs that are 
more directly related to prices in foreign markets. Many of them consequently invest in 
assets denominated in foreign currencies in order to protect or increase the value of their 
assets. 
The Bank of Japan and the Ministry of Finance Japan have estimated short-term JPY 
borrowings related to carry trade to be in the order of USD 20-40 billion
6
. When including 
individual Japanese investors, the total may be close to USD 170 billion. 
Several high yielding currencies like the New Zealand dollar (estimated to be around 
NZD 2 million per month
7
), Turkish lira, Icelandic króna, Brazilian real, Latvian lat and 
Korean won have been investment targets for carry trade. Private individuals in various 
countries have mortgages denominated in Japanese yen. 
                                                 
4
 Ministry of Finance Japan (2008) 
5
 IMF (2007b, 141) 
6
 Financial Times (14 March 2007)  
7
 IMF (2007a, 27)  
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Another estimate
8
 for net carry trade (defined as being short in JPY and long in 
foreign currency positions) is USD 915 billion in December 2006.  
As mentioned, different definitions of carry trade lead to very different estimates of 
its size depending on what kind of investments one chooses to include. Figures that are much 
higher than those stated above may include non-leveraged assets. These investments are 
consequently less interesting for those who follow short-term movements in the exchange 
rates unless they are exchanged quickly in large amounts. 
 
1.3  Empirical Tests on Japanese Yen and US Dollars 
USA and Japan are the largest and second largest national economies in the world 
respectively. The two countries are major trading partners. From the 1970s, Japanese 
financial markets were gradually deregulated and the operating procedures of the US Federal 
Reserve and the Bank of Japan converged
9
. This facilitated higher liquidity in various asset 
markets, including the markets for foreign exchange, forward contracts and treasury bills. 
Having a risk-free short term asset in a currency is considered important in order to 
tempt foreign investors into keeping some of their assets in a given currency. Such a short 
term asset in a liquid market makes it possible for investors to quickly shift their investments 
between currencies and investment types. Low trading costs give small losses in the 
transaction processes when they are combined with narrow spreads between the bid and ask 
prices on assets. 
The functioning of the US currency market has been facilitated by high liquidity 
government bonds through the Treasury bill market. The three-month bill is often used as an 
approximation of the risk-free interest rate, that is, the interest rate one can get without any 
default risk. After all, the likelihood of a state going bankrupt is usually miniscule, since the 
central bank can print more money. 
Such liquid markets, the fact that many products on the world market are priced in USD 
and the links to other markets have contributed to making the US dollar the most popular 
storage medium for surplus liquidity. 
In Japan, government securities were for a long time absent from the short-term financial 
market
10
. The Tegata market and the Gensaki market have been important for the short-term 
financial market in Japanese yen, especially from the 1970s. Certificates of Deposit (CDs) 
                                                 
8
 Gagnon and Chaboud (2007, 21-22) 
9
 Kasa and Popper (1996) 
10
 Ito (1992, 121-125) 
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grew quickly from they became available in 1979, partially at the cost of the Gensaki 
market, but alongside growth in the Tegata market. Six-month Japanese Government Bonds 
were introduced in 1986 and three-month bonds in 1989. Combined with financial 
deregulation, this has led to higher liquidity. Because of this, and the fact that they are both 
developed economies with large financial markets, it has probably become easier to compare 
returns on risk-free assets in USA and Japan. 
 
1.3.1 Uncovered Interest Parity and the Forward Rate 
One way of checking the return on Japanese yen assets compared to US dollar assets is to 
look at the return on assets that are considered to be risk-free. This is typically the case for 
three-month interest rate bonds (often referred to as bills) in the two currencies. These are 
traded in highly liquid markets. Two ways have been used here in order to check the return: 
 
1. Check if uncovered interest parity holds. 
a) Invest the initial holding of JPY in Japanese interest rate bonds. 
b) Exchange the initial amount of JPY into USD at the current JPY/USD spot 
rate, invest the USD one receives in a risk-free US asset like three-month 
treasury bills and then exchange the money back into JPY at the end of the 
three-month period at the JPY/USD spot rate. 
By comparing the returns on such investments over time, one can find out if 
uncovered interest parity has held. 
 
2. Check if there has been a forward discount bias. 
a) Do the same as in 1a.  
b) Do the same as in 1b. However, when investing in USD assets, fix the 
JPY/USD exchange rate by buying a forward contract that gives a right to 
exchange the resulting USD back into JPY at a certain exchange rate. 
By comparing the return on these investment alternatives over time, one can find 
if the forward rate has been an unbiased estimator of the future exchange rate. 
 
The data have been retrieved from the websites of the Bank of Japan (BoJ) and the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The data are on a monthly basis. 
Let the definitions be as follows: 
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r = the return in percent on Japanese three-month bills from the end of month t-3 until the 
end of month t (source: BoJ) 
r* = the return in percent on US Treasury bills from the end
11
 of month t-3 until the end 
of month t (source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis) 
Ft-3,t is the JPY/USD forward rate at time t bought at the end of month t-3 (source: BoJ) 
εt-3 is the JPY/USD spot rate at the end of month t-3 (source: BoJ) 
εt is the JPY/USD spot rate at the end of month t (source: BoJ) 
 
1.4 Uncovered Interest Parity 
In the case of uncovered interest rate parity, an investor has two options: 
a) Invest in JPY at time t-3 and gain r percent return until the end of month t. The 
value measured in JPY at time t is then (1+r) multiplied by the initial holding. 
b) Exchange the same amount of JPY into USD at spot rate εt-3 and invest in three-
month USD treasury bills with r* percent return over the three month period. The 
resulting amount in USD is then exchanged back at time t into JPY at spot rate εt. 
The value measured in JPY at the end of month t is then (1+r*)εt/εt-3 multiplied 
by the initial holding. 
  
If investment strategies a) and b) tend to give the same return over time, that is if 
 (1+r) = (1+r*)εt/εt-3 
then uncovered interest rate parity holds. 
Figure 1 on the next page shows the return for someone who measures return in JPY. 
We can see that the return on uncovered investments in USD fluctuates wildly around the 
return gained by keeping the investments in JPY. From a visual perspective, there does not 
seem to be any consistent tendency for any of the currencies to give higher return than the 
other. The USD investments sometimes give higher and sometimes lower return than JPY 
investments. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 Here, the actual interest rate figures from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis are from the beginning of 
the next month (month t-2) and are therefore an approximation of the value of the end of month t-3. 
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Figure 1: Uncovered Interest Parity Measured in JPY. For monthly three-month investment 
periods finalized from the end of January 1993 to the end of March 2008 (sources: Bank of Japan 
and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis) 
 
 
 
One can test if the difference between the two graphs is as random as it looks by checking 
the difference between the two sides in the uncovered interest parity equation. Let d1t be the 
difference 
1+r = (1+r*)εt/εt-3 + d1t 
d1t = (1+r) – (1+r*)εt/εt-3 
By adding up all the values of d1t and dividing by the number of observations, we get 
∑d1t /175 = –0.64 percentage points 
In other words, when we measure return in JPY, monthly uncovered investments in three-
month USD treasury bills gave an average of 0.6 percentage points higher return than 
investments in three-month JPY interest bills for investments that were settled from the end 
of January 1993 to the end of March 2008. 
In order to complete the picture, one can look at the same investment strategy as seen 
from the perspective of an investor who measures return in USD. That is, we want to find 
out if the following equation holds: 
1+r* = (1+r)(1/εt)/(1/εt-3) 
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1+r* = (1+r)(εt-3/εt) 
The two sides of the equation are depicted in figure 2. The data which have been used are the 
same as before. 
 
Figure 2: Uncovered Interest Parity Measured in USD. For monthly three-month investment 
periods finalized from the end of January 1993 to the end of March 2008 
 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the return for someone who measures return in USD. Since this is basically 
the inverse version of figure 1, there does not from a visual perspective seem to be any 
consistent pattern here either. 
 
By using the same error term as before, we have 
d2t = (1+r*) – (1+r)εt-3/εt  
By adding up all the values of d2t and dividing by the number of observations, we get 
∑d2t /175 = 0.28 percentage points 
 
This indicates that for investments that were settled in the period from the end of January 
1993 to the end of March 2008, there was a 0.3 percentage point excess return on average for 
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the period as a whole on three-month USD Treasury bills compared to similar investments in 
JPY when we measure the return in USD. 
From these two perspectives (return measured in JPY and USD), it may seem like 
uncovered interest parity did not hold for the three-month investments periods that were 
finalized in the period from the end of January 1993 to the end of March 2008. 
One way of checking the figures, is to look at several shorter periods instead of only 
at the aggregate result. By dividing the period into three-year periods, one can get an 
impression of the development over time. The table below shows the differences between the 
two currencies in these periods. 
We get the following average excess return in percentage points as seen from the 
perspective of an investor that measures return in JPY and from the perspective of an 
investor that measures return in USD: 
 
Table 1: Checking Uncovered Interest Parity (monthly investments in three-month bonds) 
Period 
Excess return on JPY measured in 
JPY (percentage points) 
Excess return on USD measured in 
USD (percentage points) 
1993 – 1995 +0.93 –1.5 
1996 – 1998 –2.6 +2.1 
1999 – 2001 –1.7 +1.5 
2002 – 2004 + 1.2 –1.5 
2005 – 2007 –1.6 +1.5 
1993 - March 2008 –0.64 +0.28 
 
From table 1, we can see that the data from the period January 1993 to February 2008 
indicate that there was an excess return on USD three-month bills compared to JPY three-
month bonds in the period as a whole. However, when the whole period is divided into three-
year periods, these show a much more volatile development. Three periods gave excess 
return on USD investments and two periods gave excess return on JPY investments. 
 
1.4.1 Regression Analysis 
In order to gain more insight into uncovered interest parity, we can use a linear regression. 
We start with the uncovered interest parity condition, rearrange and then take the logarithm:  
(1+r) = (1+r*)εt/εt-3 
εt/εt-3 = (1+r)/(1+r*) 
log(εt/εt-3) = log[(1+r)/(1+r*)] 
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log(εt) – log(εt-3) = log(1+r) – log(1+r*) 
The linear regression can then be written as: 
log(εt) – log(εt-3) = α1 + β1[log(1+r) – log(1+r*)] + e1t 
where e1t is the expectation error. If α1 = 0 and β1 = 1, then there is equality between the 
percentage reduction in the value of the yen and the interest rate differential (r*- r) over the 
same period. Consequently, we would like to test if the H0 hypothesis that β1 = 1 can be 
rejected. The results are listed in table 2. 
 We can also do a regression analysis with USD as numéraire. Again, we rearrange 
the uncovered interest parity condition and take the logarithm: 
1+r* = (1+r)(1/εt)/(1/εt-3) 
 (1+r*)/(1+r) = (1/εt)/(1/εt-3) 
 εt-3/εt = (1+r*)/(1+r) 
 log(εt-3) – log(εt) = log(1+r*) – log(1+r) 
The regression can then be written as 
log(εt-3) – log(εt) = α2 + β2[log(1+r*) – log(1+r)] + e2t 
The null-hypothesis is now that β2 = 1. The results are listed in table 2. 
 
Table 2: Regression Results for Uncovered Interest Parity 
Para-
meter 
Estimate 
95 % confidence 
interval 
R
2
 t-value p-value 
Standard-
error 
Obser-
vations 
α1 –0.01479 [–0.0252, –0.0071] 0.81 –3.78 0.00022 0.0039 175 
β1 –4.07233 [–6.1278, –2.0168] 0.81 –3,91 0.00013 1.0414 175 
α2 +0.01479 [0.0071, 0.0225] 0.81 3.78 0.00022 0.0039 175 
β2 –4.07233 [–6.1278, –2.0168] 0.81 –3.91 0.00013 1.0414 175 
 
The 95 % confidence intervals for β1 and β2 are the same, and they are far from including the 
value 1. The t-value (–3.91) for the βs is acceptably high in terms of absolute value. The sum 
of squares due to error is R
2
 = 0.81 and fairly close to the value 1 that one could ideally hope 
to get and can therefore be considered satisfactory. This indicates that we can be quite 
confident in rejecting the null hypothesis. 
The remarkable thing is that we do not only get an estimate for β for that is 
significantly different from 1, but in fact clearly negative (β1 = β2 = –4.07). This implies that 
instead of having a weakening of the currency where the interest rate increases (as would 
have been the case with β = 1), the currency with the increasing interest rate actually had a 
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tendency to strengthen. This means that we can clearly reject that uncovered interest parity 
held in the period 1993 to March 2008. 
 
1.5 Forward Discount Bias 
The method used in this section looks at interest rate parity from another perspective by 
using forward contracts to fix the future interest rate. It also points towards Siegel‟s original 
formulation of the Siegel paradox with the forward rate. In order to protect/cover the value 
of the investments, the investor may use forward contracts to eliminate the exchange rate 
risk. Let us assume that the investor has the following two investment options 
a) Invest in JPY three-month bills. The value measured in JPY at the end of the 
period is then as before (1+r). 
b) Do like in the case of uncovered interest rate parity, but in addition buy a 
JPY/USD forward contract at the end of month (t-3) which gives a right to 
exchange the resulting amount of USD back into JPY at exchange rate Ft-3,t at the 
end of month t. The return on this investment is then (1+r*)(Ft-3,t)/(εt-3). 
 
If investment strategies a) and b) tend to give the same return over time, that is if 
(1+r) = (1+r*)(Ft-3,t)/(εt-3) 
then the forward rate has been an unbiased estimator of the future exchange rate. 
It has been pointed out
12
 that covered interest rate parity must hold. The reason is that 
the entire operation can be conducted at time t-3 by exchanging the initial holding of JPY 
into USD at rate εt-3 , invest the USD in three-month USD interest rate bills paying 1+r* and 
then lock in a future JPY payout by selling the forward contract at rate Ft-3,t . The entire 
operation can be conducted at time t, without risk. So if covered interest rate parity does not 
hold, there has been an arbitrage opportunity. 
Figure 3 shows that for someone who measures the return on covered investments in 
JPY, the return on USD tended to be systematically lower than the return on JPY. 
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 Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, 585-586) 
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Figure 3. Covered Investments Measured in JPY. For monthly three-month investment periods 
finalized from the end of January 1993 to the end of March 2008 
 
 
 
 
Investments in JPY gave an average of 0.17 percentage point higher return in the period as a 
whole than similar covered investments in USD. 
For the period 1995 to 2002 the graph indicates that there was a higher risk premium 
on Japanese yen than in the time before and after. Some have described the 1990s as Japan‟s 
lost decade as the Japanese economy performed less well than expected. Hayashi and 
Prescott (2002) study the performance in the Japanese economy from 1984 to 2000 and find 
that there was a fall in the growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP) in the 1990s and a 
reduction in the average hours worked per week from 1988 to 1993.  
We can also see that there was a widening towards the end of the period which 
coincided with the weakening of the dollar during the financial turbulence which originated 
in the US mortgage market
13
. 
In order to look at the situation in another way, we can use the same data and use 
USD as the measuring rod. That is, we want to test if the following equation holds: 
(1+r*)  = (1+r)∙(1/Ft-3,t)/[(1/εt-3)] 
                                                 
13
 The subprime crisis 
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(1+r*) = (1+r)(εt-3/Ft-3,t) 
The two sides of the equation are drawn in figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Covered Investments Measured in USD. For monthly three-month investment periods 
finalized from the end of January 1993 to the end of March 2008 
 
 
 
Figure 4 shows the covered returns for someone who measures the return in USD. Again, we 
find that investments in JPY have systematically tended to be higher than for USD for 
investments that were completed in the period January 1993 to March 2008. 
When using the US dollar as numéraire, one finds that covered investments in JPY 
gave 0.18 percentage points higher return on average than USD investments. 
From these two perspectives, it is natural to conclude that there has been a forward 
discount bias for monthly, three-month long investment periods that were finalized in the 
period from the end of January 1993 until the end of March 2008. However, although the 
figures both indicate the same level of excess return on JPY three-month bonds over three-
month Treasury bills, the difference is small. 
By once again dividing the investment period into three shorter three-year periods, 
one can check the development over time. This is shown in table 3. 
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Table 3: Checking Covered Investments (monthly investments in three-month bonds) 
Period 
Excess return on JPY measured in 
JPY (percentage points) 
Excess return on USD measured in 
USD (percentage points) 
1993 – 1995 +0.13 –0.13 
1996 – 1998 +0.24 –0.24 
1999 – 2001 +0.24 –0.24 
2002 – 2004 +0.09 –0.09 
2005 – 2007 +0.14 –0.14 
1993 - March 2008 +0.17 –0.18 
 
We can see from figure 3, figure 4 and from table 3 that when the foreign currency 
investments were covered, then investments in JPY denominated three-month bonds 
consistently gave higher return than investments in USD denominated three-month bills. 
This applied to the period as a whole, measured in both currencies and for three-year 
sections within this period. 
 
1.5.1 Regression: Prediction Bias in the Forward Rate 
We can test further by using the forward premium (Ft-3,t – εt) as the independent variable
14
. 
The linear regression then becomes: 
log εt – log εt-3 = α3 + β3∙[log(Ft-3,t) – log(εt-3)] + e3t 
We can change the numéraire to USD and test if the following equation holds: 
log εt-3 – log εt = α4 + β4∙[log(εt-3) – log(Ft-3,t)] + e4t 
 
If the interception points of the regressions are 0 and the slopes 1, then there is equality 
between the spot rate at time t and the prediction made at time (t-3) by the forward rate. 
Consequently, we would like to test if the null-hypothesis β = 1 can be rejected. The results 
are listed in table 4. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 According to Froot and Thaler (1990), the linear regression log εt – log εt-3 = α + β∙[log(r*) – log(r)] + et is 
sometimes replaced by the forward discount which is the formulation used here: log εt – log εt-3 = α + β∙[log(Ft-
3,t) – log(εt-3)] + et under the assumption that by arbitrage, the forward discount must equal the interest rate 
differential. If not, it would be possible to get a riskless profit. Some market participants including banks allow 
forward rates to be set by interest rate differentials. When r and r* are small, Ft-3,t/εt-3 = (1+r)/(1+r*) can be 
approximated by log(Ft-3,t) – log(εt-3) = r*– r  
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Table 4: Regression Results for Covered Investments 
Para-
meter 
Estimate 
95 % confidence 
interval 
R
2
 t-value p-value 
Standard-
error 
Obser-
vations 
α3 -0.01305 [–0.02105, –0.00504] 0.055 –3.22 0.0015 0.00406 183 
β3 -2.91102 [–4.68225, –1.13979] 0.055 –3.24 0.0014 0.89766 183 
α4 0.01305 [0.00504, 0.02105] 0.055 3.22 0.0015 0.00406 183 
β4 -2.91102 [–4.68225,–1.13979] 0.055 –3.24 0.0014 0.89766 183 
 
 
We see from table 4 that the beta values are both estimated to be (–2.91). The 95 % 
confidence intervals for β3 and β4 are equal to each other in the case of covered investments. 
The confidence intervals for the βs do not include the value 1. The absolute t-value (–3.24) is 
satisfactory. The sum of squares due to error is R
2
 = 0.055. Such a low R-squared value is 
not uncommon in time-series data. However, if one wants to make a more rigorous analysis, 
one can use other methods
15
. 
The remarkable thing is again that we do not only get estimates for the βs that are 
significantly different from 1, but clearly negative (β3 = β4 = –2.91). This implies that the 
forward rate was not a good estimator of the future spot rate. This means that we can reject 
the null-hypothesis and conclude that there was a forward discount bias.  
The results mean that for USD/JPY investments that were finalized in the period 
January 1993 to March 2008, the forward rate did not fit the JPY/USD spot rate three 
months later when taking into account interest rate differentials between the two currencies. 
There was a bias. The failure of regressions like these to get an estimate of β = 1 is often 
referred to as the forward discount bias
16
. 
This is somewhat surprising. One would expect that when there is a systematic 
pattern where covered investments in one of the currencies give higher return over time 
because of a bias in the forward rate, then some investors would discover this pattern and 
make use of the arbitrage opportunity. They would do so in the periods following after the 
discovery for instance by offering or buying forward contracts until the pattern disappeared. 
Still, when this does not happen, there must be some good reason for this. This is discussed 
in the following section. 
 
                                                 
15
 Models like autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) and other ARCH models with 
cointegration or methods developed by Engle and Granger are possible methods for this purpose.  
16
 Froot and Thaler (1990) 
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1.6 Potential Reasons 
If the risk premium on JPY assets is higher than on USD assets, then the result (that there 
has been a forward discount bias) could make sense.  
 Although the yen gave higher covered return over the period surveyed here, it is 
possible that such excess returns are wiped out in the event of rare phenomena. The “peso 
problem”17 is a name that has been used about a situation in the early 1970s when the 
Mexican peso was tied to the US dollar. Since USD bank accounts gave lower interest than 
the peso, this provided an arbitrage opportunity. However, Milton Friedman noted that this 
may have been a reflection of market participants worrying that the peso would be devalued. 
In August 1976, the peso was allowed to float and fell sharply in value. That wiped out the 
gains of investors that were still unfortunate to be long in pesos. The anomaly became easier 
to understand when the risk of devaluation was taken into account. As the Japanese and the 
US both have well developed financial markets and are more similar than the US economy 
and the Mexican economy in the 1970s, the return differentials are more difficult to explain 
in this case. 
It is possible that the JPY treasuries market is still somewhat less liquid than the USD 
treasuries market, leading to a higher risk premium for JPY denominated bonds. Differences 
in taxes and regulation may also be relevant. 
Japanese savers may be interested in channeling savings into assets denominated in 
other currencies than JPY in order to find more interesting assets than the three-month bills 
we have looked at here. For instance, Japanese investors may be interested in higher yielding 
assets like shares. They may be acting rationally if they succeed in finding such assets. 
However, this does not explain the forward discount bias for low-risk assets. 
Investors may require a higher return on JPY as a compensation for investing in JPY 
and virtually other currencies since the USD remains the world‟s leading foreign reserve 
currency
18
 and the main price setting currency for important tradable products on the world 
market. On the other hand, this claim does not fit well with periods where the USD had high 
                                                 
17
 For more about the peso problem, see Sill (2000).  
18
 Although the US dollar has been the favorite currency of many governments and central banks, statistics 
from the US Department of the Treasury show that Japan was one of the countries that reduced the holdings of 
US Treasury securities from February 2007 to February 2008. This may have to do with the weakening of the 
US dollar and the relative rise of the euro and other currencies relative to the USD. Some foreign countries 
have consequently increased the shares invested in other currencies and assets like foreign equities and 
corporate bonds. 
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interest rates and a simultaneous strengthening of the dollar, as was the case in the period 
from late 1980 until 1985
19
. 
The forward discount bias may also be an indication that capital mobility is 
imperfect
20
. Although the currency exchange rate markets are often described as very liquid 
with high volumes being traded every minute of the day around the globe, there are related 
assets like forward contracts that are sometimes traded in thinner volumes. Although the 
total volume of a particular asset is traded in large numbers worldwide, the markets are 
fragmented into different locations, with different firms carrying out the trades and at 
different costs. Investors will normally demand to be compensated for the risk they take 
when offering prices in markets that sometimes take time to clear. These liquidity risks may 
be difficult to capture in the models and could lead to a difference between the observed 
trading prices and the idealized prices predicted by the models. 
If investors are risk averse over the three-month investment periods that have been 
checked here, and if they are predominantly worried that the exchange rate will move in the 
opposite direction of what is predicted by the interest parity condition, then the investors 
may be willing to buy contracts that protect them against such currency exchange rate 
movements. This could potentially distort the forward rate and give the observed bias. 
However, this does not explain why investors with other preferences do not correct for this 
by entering into forward contracts that make use of this arbitrage opportunity. One would 
expect them to do so until the forward discount bias disappears. 
The findings that have been made here are in agreement with the majority of similar 
studies. However, there are some studies that have looked at longer maturity bonds and some 
studies that have looked at short-term data
21
.  
 
1.7 Background: The Japanese Economy 
In order to shed light on the outflow of capital from Japan, we can look at a few aspects of 
the development of the Japanese economy from the 1980s until today. I will do this in the 
following part by considering some events internationally and some changes that were made 
in the Japanese financial markets. This could contribute to explain why some Japanese 
investors over the years have been tempted to place their money abroad. 
                                                 
19
 See Froot and Thaler (1990) for more about the strengthening of the USD in the first half of the 1980s.  
20
 Feldstein and Horioka (1980) found that savings and real investments were correlated in various countries, 
which indicates that capital mobility is imperfect. 
21
 See section 1.9 for more about what others have found 
20 
 
  
In the 22 September 1985 Plaza Accord, the G5 countries agreed on a concerted 
effort to depreciate the US dollar compared to the Japanese yen and the German mark. The 
main purpose was to reduce the US trade deficit. In the period from 1985 to 1987, the 
JPY/USD exchange rate fell from around JPY 250/USD to around JPY 122/USD. The 
following strengthening of the JPY led to massive investments by JPY investors in the USA 
and other countries. 
 
Figure 5: JPY/USD Exchange Rate 1973–2008. 1949–1971: Approximately JPY 360/USD under 
the Bretton Woods system (source: Bank of Japan) 
 
 
The G6 Louvre Accord was signed 22 February 1987 in order to stop the decline in 
the value of the USD. After the October 1987 stock market crash, the Japanese stock market 
rose back to record levels more quickly than US stocks did
22
. 
In the late 1980s, Japanese banks extended loans under a collateral system based on 
property values. The banks were more than willing to lend money to the public when 
property prices rose. This led to more lending to finance real estate investments. Property 
prices were pushed up further to unprecedented levels. The share prices of Japanese firms 
also rose when the increase in property prices made asset values in the balance sheets of 
                                                 
22
 Ito (1992, 426-438) 
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firms rise, facilitating even more lending from Japanese banks which by then had come to 
dominate the list of the biggest banks in the world. 
In the beginning of the 1990s, there was a sense among analysts that Japanese stock 
prices had increased too much in the 1980s during the bubble years following the Plaza 
Accord. There was a growing sense among analysts that Japanese stocks were overvalued 
based such indicators as firms‟ q-ratio23 and the price earnings ratios (P/E) of shares. The 
end of the 1980s is often referred to as the bubble years. 
 
Figure 6: The Tokyo Stock Exchange - Nikkei 225. (Source: Bank of Japan) 
 
 
On 29 December 1989, the Nikkei 225 index on the Tokyo Stock Exchange reached 
an intraday high of 38 957.44. In August 1990 the Nikkei 225 dropped 16 % and around this 
period, the bubble started to burst. After that, Japanese stocks fell to below 10 000 in 2001. 
This depressive Japanese stock market (as seen from a Japanese investor‟s perspective, since 
the Japanese share prices may have decreased less when measured in some other currencies 
because of strengthening of the JPY) coupled with low interest rates on Japanese bank 
accounts, made the foreign currency market look increasingly attractive to Japanese 
investors. 
The Japanese Government deregulated financial markets further in the period 1997 to 
2001 when the most important parts of the Japanese „financial Big Bang‟ were implemented. 
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 Q-ratio: A firms market value divided by the firms asset value 
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The aim of this deregulation process was to make Tokyo regain its position as a major 
financial centre like London and New York. 
Bank of Japan started to cut the key interest rate in 1991 in order to revive growth. 
The interest rate was gradually reduced towards the middle of the 1990s, but growth 
remained sluggish. As mentioned, the 1990s have often been referred to as Japan‟s lost 
decade. 
The bad loan problem in Japanese banks reached a climax in the beginning of the 
new millennium before it was gradually resolved and the majority of the bad loans were 
written off. During the 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium, many analysts were 
negatively surprised by the lack of recovery in the Japanese economy. The stock market 
remained at a low level and economic growth was low. In spite of this, unemployment was 
relatively low and social stability high. The savings rates were high
24
 and consumption 
growth was moderate. 
The combination of lack of increase in domestic share prices, frustration with low 
interest rates on Japanese bank accounts, continued financial deregulation and high stocks of 
savings, may all have contributed to making investments in foreign currencies look tempting 
to many Japanese investors in the 1990s. 
 
1.8 Data Quality 
In the following section, I will discuss some of the implications the data quality may have 
had on the findings in the thesis. 
 
Time differences 
The data have been used in this thesis have been retrieved from two different sources, 
namely the Bank of Japan (BoJ) and the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. They have 
collected the data from various markets. While the BoJ data are from the end of each 
business month, the Federal Reserve Bank‟s data are from the beginning of the next month. 
When these data (which are separated by up to a few days depending on the weekends and 
holidays) are coupled, then one risks that intermediate events and new information could 
change the expectations of investors. This makes the prices somewhat different from to what 
they would have been if they had all been collected at the same time. 
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 Katayama (2006) points out that the saving rate in Japan was above 10 percent in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
This was higher than in any other developed country. From around 1999, the saving rate started to decline 
rapidly. 
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Because of the location of Japan and USA on the Earth, the Japanese markets always 
open earlier on the same date. Tokyo is nine hours
25
 ahead of Coordinated Universal Time 
(UTC, which is roughly equal to Greenwich Mean Time) all year, since Japan has not 
observed daylight saving time since the period 1948-1951. New York is four hours after 
UTC in the summer and five hours after in the winter. This means that the time difference 
between Tokyo and New York is 13 hours in the summer half of the year and 14 hours in the 
winter half. Because of this time difference, the Tokyo financial markets and the New York 
financial markets do not in general have overlapping trading hours. Information that flows to 
the markets will therefore sometimes change prices in the Tokyo market first and sometimes 
in the New York markets first
26
. 
Ito (1992, 338) shows how various news impacted the JPY/USD exchange rate in 
March 1985. The opening exchange rates in the Tokyo market in this month were 
approximately the same as the closing exchange rates in the New York market (which closed 
two to three hours earlier). This supports the efficient market hypothesis which says that the 
prices on traded assets reflect all known information. 
Because there is a time difference between the New York and Tokyo markets, the 
prices will have changed between the two moments or opening periods from which the data 
have been collected. However, it is probably fair to assume that the price movements are not 
systematically going in one direction and that the movements do not change the main 
conclusions in this thesis. 
 
Ways of Improving the Data 
Since we have data from the turn of each month while the interest rate papers and forward 
contracts both point three months into the future, there is an overlap of two months between 
succeeding data and of one month when there is a two month period in between them. 
Because of this, the prices are partially overlapping in terms of information content and 
variation. This overlapping can be reduced by using one-month treasury bills instead of 
three-month treasury bills. The reason why three-month bills have been used here is that 
liquidity is high and that they are considered to be a good estimate of the risk free rate. Also, 
it may be more difficult to find data for one-month forward exchange rate contracts than for 
the three-month forward contracts that have been used here. 
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 Time and Date AS: Time zone changes and daylight saving time start/end dates 
26
 For more about the settlement rules and functioning of the financial markets, see Chaboud and Wright (2003) 
and Rose and Lyons (1995) 
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One could possibly improve the data set by for instance selecting mid-week data for 
days on which the Tokyo financial markets and the New York markets are both open. This 
would reduce the time gap compared to the situation here, where some data are from the end 
of the month and others (the data for the US three month treasury bills) are from the 
beginning of the next month. 
 
1.9 Discussion and Literature Review 
In this section, I look at some of the findings presented in other papers. The purpose is to 
compare the results that have been obtained here with what others have found. 
According to Froot and Thaler (1990), the average estimate of the coefficient for the 
slope β is (–0.88) across 75 published estimates. A few are positive, but none is equal to or 
greater than the null hypothesis of β = 1. A negative value of β means that when the annual 
interest rate in a currency increases by one percentage point, the value of the same currency 
increases by |β| percent per year. This is the opposite of what one would expect from the 
unbiasedness hypothesis. According to Froot and Thaler, two interpretations are common: 1. 
There is a time-varying risk premium on foreign exchange (implying that when the value of 
a currency increases, it becomes more risky and this requires a higher risk premium). 2. 
Expectational errors explain the bias in the forward discount and the interest differential. 
In a survey of the advances made in research on forward rate bias, Engel (1996) also 
finds that the change in the future exchange rate is generally negatively related to the 
forward discount. 
Both of the above surveys are in agreement with the findings in this thesis. This is 
comforting since it indicates that the fact that the data are collected at different times for the 
Japanese and US markets does not lead to any systematic distortion in the data and the 
results derived from them. 
Chinn and Meredith (2004) look at longer maturity government bonds and find some 
support of the uncovered interest parity hypothesis for the Group of Seven (G7) countries. 
For uncovered interest parity I found a beta value of (–4.07) which is fairly similar to 
the (–2.887) found by Chinn and Meredith in their estimate three month bonds in Japan and 
the US. This indicates that the result obtained in this thesis is reasonable. Since the 
underlying data are not available, it is not possible to explain the difference that still remains 
between the results here and their result. 
25 
 
  
Chaboud and Wright (2003) go in the opposite direction and look at shorter time 
horizons, taking into account the settlement procedures in the spot foreign exchange market. 
Their results are supportive of uncovered interest parity over very short spans. When having 
overnight positions, investors can be compensated for devaluation risks through the interest 
rate which is only paid overnight. 
Rose and Lyons (1995), study intraday movements (when investors are not paid 
interest rates) and find that currencies that are under attack tend to appreciate during the 
trading day. This may be interpreted as a compensation for the risk of holding those 
currencies. 
The three articles mentioned above are consequently a support for the uncovered 
interest rate parity hypothesis in spite of the lack of support for it in the studies related to 
intermediate length investments. 
Siegel (1972) writes that even in the simple case where investors are risk-neutral, it 
can be shown that the forward price of the foreign currency is not an unbiased estimator of 
the anticipated future exchange rate. Since the Siegel paradox deals with forward rates and 
foreign currencies, it may be relevant to the results obtained in Chapter 1. A simple version 
of the Siegel paradox is described in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
26 
 
  
2 Theoretical Implications 
In this chapter, I look at the Siegel paradox and the two-envelope problem in order to gain 
some insight into these two puzzles. I do this by using simple examples, looking at potential 
reasons for the paradoxes and relating these to the simple examples. By investigating some 
other ways of looking at the problems, I compare them and try to find differences and 
similarities between them. The purpose is to find out if there is some connection between the 
forward discount bias observed in Chapter 1 and the Siegel paradox. 
  
2.1 Siegel’s Paradox 
Siegel (1972, 1975) studied risk, interest rates and forward exchange rates. He stated that it 
can be shown that even when investors are risk neutral, the forward price of the foreign 
currency is not an unbiased estimator of the anticipated future spot price. Rather than 
following his notation and description, a simplified example will be provided that gives 
some intuitive connotations to the JPY/USD market which has been used as an example in 
Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
 
2.1.1 A Simple Version 
Assume that the exchange rate is JPY 100 per USD in period one. There are two periods and 
there is no interest rate paid in any of the currencies. Let there be two possible outcomes 
with equal probability: The value of the currency either halves or doubles compared to the 
other. The example is chosen for the sake of simplicity – this makes it possible for us to 
study a simple calculation problem – and because the investment choice looks symmetric 
regardless of which currency is used as numéraire. The example is symmetric since a 
doubling of the value of the USD means a halving of the value of the JPY and vice versa. 
 Let an investor start out with JPY 100 in period one. The investor can then think in 
the following way: I have JPY 100. If I keep the JPY 100, I will end up with the same 
amount in period two. 
The investor also has another option: To exchange the JPY 100 into USD 1 in period 
one. There would be two possible outcomes in period two: The USD 1 will be worth either 
JPY 50 or JPY 200. 
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The investor can then think in the following way if he measures the value of his 
assets in JPY: Since there is 50 % chance of a halving and 50 % chance of a doubling of the 
value of the USD, the expected value in period two of exchanging the JPY 100 into USD 1 
in period one is: 
E(X) = 50 % ∙JPY 50 + 50 % ∙JPY 200 = JPY 25 + JPY 100 = JPY 125. 
In other words: The expected return on leaving the initial JPY 100 in Japanese yen is 0 % 
while the expected return when exchanging the money into US dollars in period one is 25 %. 
 However, this argument can also be used by an investor who measures the value of 
her assets in USD. She can argue that if she keeps her initial US dollar, she will get no 
return, but if she exchanges the US dollar into JPY 100 in period one, the expected value 
would be: 
 E(Y) = 50 % ∙USD 2 + 50 % ∙USD( ½) = USD 1¼. 
Again, the investor would expect no return on the domestic currency, but 25 % return on the 
other currency. Only very risk-averse investors would then choose not to exchange their 
currency into the other in period one. Both risk-seeking and risk neutral investors would 
exchange their assets into other currencies if this way of thinking was correct. Obviously, 
there must be something wrong with the argument. 
 
2.2 The Two-Envelope Problem 
It is possible to give an example of the so-called two envelope paradox which resembles the 
above version of the Siegel paradox. 
Consider the following situation: Two persons are given one envelope each. One 
envelope contains twice as much as the other. The two persons are asked if they want to 
switch envelopes.  
 Let us assume that each player thinks in the following way: 
 
Assume that my envelope contains x. Then the other envelope contains either y1=x/2 or 
y2=2x. The expected, certain value I will end up with if I keep my envelope, is x. On the other 
hand, the expected value in the other envelope is 50 % ∙ x/2 + 50 % ∙ 2x = 1¼ x. 
 
Because the expected return from switching is x/4, I should switch. 
  
Like in the simplified example with the Siegel paradox (where both investors would switch 
into the other currency), both persons would here choose to switch into the other envelope. 
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 In fact, the two players would continue to switch envelopes indefinitely if it was 
possible. However, this is a zero sum game (the sum of the players‟ payoffs must be zero) so 
both the players cannot expect positive return. Obviously, there is again some serious flaw in 
the rationale leading to the paradox. 
 
2.3 Reasons 
The Siegel paradox is by Jeremy Siegel (1972) ascribed to Jensen‟s inequality which states 
that the inverse of the expectation of the exchange rate is less than or equal to the 
expectation of the inverse of the exchange rate. The following indicates some reasons for the 
paradox. 
 
2.3.1 Jensen’s Inequality 
Jensen‟s inequality can in this case be described in the following way27: 
Ft = the JPY/USD forward exchange rate at time t 
ξt = the USD/JPY forward exchange rate at time t 
εt+3 = the JPY/USD spot exchange rate in the US market at time t+3 
¥t+3 = the USD/JPY spot exchange rate at time t+3 
Assume that investors have the same access to information and that they form their 
expectations based on all information available at time t under the rational expectation 
hypothesis. Assume that both covered and uncovered interest parity holds so that the forward 
rates equal the expected spot rates 
Ft = E[εt+3] 
 ξt = E[¥t+3] 
Arbitrage should ensure
28
 that the following consistency conditions hold for all t in the spot 
markets and the forward markets: 
 εt = 1/¥t ↔ εt ¥t = 1 
Ft = 1/ξt ↔ Ft ξt = 1 
Consequently, we should also have 
1/Ft = 1/E[εt+3] and 1/Ft = ξt = E[¥t+3] = E[1/εt+3]  (since ¥t+3 = 1/1/εt+3) 
Putting these together, we get 
 1/E[εt+3] = E[1/εt+3] 
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 The thought sequence follows Chu (2005) with some additional intermediate steps 
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 If not, investors would be able to sell currency in one market and sell the currency with a profit in another 
market. Forward rates would be distorted (biased) and provide arbitrage opportunities  
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However, the above equation violates Jensen‟s inequality29 which states that the value of the 
value of the integral of a convex function to the integral of the convex function: 
 1/E[εt+3] ≤ E[1/εt+3] 
If Jensen‟s inequality holds, then we cannot at the same time have 
 1/ Ft = E[1/εt+3] 
Because 1/εt+3 is a strictly convex function and εt+3 is a random variable with positive 
variance. 
 
The above result can be used in the example that I have given about the Siegel paradox. We 
can see from that example and also from the example with the two envelope problem that 
Jensen‟s inequality holds in those cases. 
First, I do the calculation in the example with the Siegel paradox and get: 
1/E(εt+3) = 1 / (50 % ∙ JPY 200/USD + 50 % ∙ JPY 50/USD) = 1 / (JPY 125/USD) 
  = (1/125) USD/JPY 
  < 
 E(1/εt+3) = 50 % ∙ 1 / (JPY 200/USD) + 50 % ∙ 1 / (JPY 50/USD) 
  = 1 / (JPY 400/USD) + 1/ (JPY 100/USD) = (1+4) / (JPY 400/USD) 
  = (1/80) USD/JPY 
 
Similarly, in the simple version of the two envelope paradox, we get the following result for 
Jensen‟s inequality: 
 1/E(X) = 1 / (50 % ∙ x/2 + 50 % ∙ 2x) = 1/(x/4 + x) = 1/(5x/4) = (4/5)/x 
   < 
 E(1/Z) = 50 % ∙ 1/(x/2) + 50 % ∙ 1/(2x) = 1/x + (1/4)/x = (5/4)/x 
These two results indicate that the paradoxes may have a common cause. 
 
2.3.2 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 
The following condition says that expected real return
30
 is equal to zero 
E[(Ft,t+3 – εt+3)/ Pt+3] = 0 
When substituting εt+3∙P*t+3 = Pt+3 into the equation above, one gets 
E[(Ft,t+3 – εt+3)/(εt+3∙P*t+3)] = 0 
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 For more about Jensen‟s inequality, see for instance Jensen (1905) and Needham (1993) 
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 Real return: The expected real increase in value. The subsequent lines follow the description in Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (1996, 587) 
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Multiplying numerator and denominator by (–1)/(Ft-3,t∙εt+3) gives 
 E[(1/Ft,t+3 – 1/εt+3)/P*t+3] = 0 
Since Ft,t+3 is known at time t, all the equations hold when PPP holds. Then it does not matter 
which currency is used as numéraire. However, the equivalence between the equations above 
break down when PPP does not hold. There is also an unexplained difference between the 
forward rate and the expected future exchange rate when one uses a logarithmic function. 
If purchasing power parity holds, then in does not matter which currency is used as 
numéraire, but the problem returns if PPP ceases to hold. 
 
2.4 How to Avoid the Problem  
Siegel (1972) states that if one changes numéraire, the forward discount bias would not 
materialize. In spite of this, it is then stated that the natural numéraire is the domestic 
currency so that the analysis made in the article is the proper formulation. However, based 
on the following line of reasoning, this could be problematic. The reason is that the 
formulation using only one of the currencies as fixed, does not take into account all the 
possible perspectives, resulting in this case to a lack of symmetry. 
Langan (2000a, 2000b) looks at the two envelope paradox and suggests various ways of 
resolving it. A flaw in the argument used above is that both players imagine that only the 
content of their own envelope is fixed while they let only the content of the other envelope 
vary. However, there is no reason to give one‟s own envelope special treatment. Not all 
arithmetic possibilities have been taken into account when a player considers the contents of 
only one of the envelopes as fixed. If the rationale used previously had been correct, then 
each player could have considered the content of the other player‟s envelope as fixed and 
thereby end up with the opposite conclusion: That one would actually lose from switching. 
By introducing the objective total value |G| of the envelope game, the result is31 that 
one‟s own envelope contains either |G|/3 or 2|G|/3 whereas the other envelope contains 
either 2|G|/3 or |G|/3. The expected value in the other envelope is then 
 E(x) = 50 % ∙ |G|/3 + 50 % ∙ 2|G|/3 = |G|/2 
The expected return is then zero for both players. 
In the incomplete reasoning in section 2.3, symmetry can be restored by also taking 
into account the situation where the other currency is fixed. One will then find that when 
considering all the arithmetic possibilities, the expected return from switching envelope 
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 The following deliberations can be found in a more stringent form in Langan (2000b)  
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becomes zero. This can be seen from the following way of thinking. Subscripts 1 and 2 after 
the x or y indicate that the variable in question is allowed to take on two different values 
(and therefore dependent) while the x or y written without subscript indicates that the 
variable is fixed and independent. When |G| is the total value of the game, then the 
conditionally dependent variable can take on half or double the value |G|/3. That is, the 
conditionally dependent value can take on the value |G|/6 or 2|G|/3. Actually, this tells us 
that there is something problematic with the formulation that leads to the two-envelope 
paradox. By implicitly choosing |G|/6 or 2|G|/3, the player does not only try to switch 
envelopes, but games (which is obviously impossible). The value spread is twice what it 
should be, as the higher of the two values is only twice as high as the lower value, not four 
times as high. The following method is used by Langan to get an acceptable result. 
Symmetry is restored by taking into account both possible subjective frames:  
 
Subjective frame 1: 
Assume that my envelope contains the fixed amount x and that the other envelope contains 
either y1=x/2 or y2=2x. 
If I lose, then gain1 = -x/2. If I win, then gain2 is x. 
My expected gain is 50 % ∙ (-x/2) + 50 % ∙ x = x/4. 
 
As mentioned above, this is not the only arithmetic possibility. The picture can be completed 
by adding the subjective frame where y is fixed and x is the conditionally dependent. 
 
Subjective frame 2:  
Assume that the other envelope contains the fixed amount y and that my envelope contains
32
 
either x1= 2y or x2=y/2. 
If I lose, then gain1 = -y = -x1/2. If I win, then gain2 = y/2 = x2 = x1/4 
My expected gain is 50 % ∙ (-x1/2) + 50 % ∙ x1/4 = -x1/8 = -x/4 
 
Since none of the two subjective frames has precedence over the other, the true expectation 
is x/4 + (-x/4) = 0 
                                                 
32
 The relationship between x1 and x2 is x1/2 = 2x2 ↔ x2= x1/4. The last equality sign (-x1/8 = -x/4) follows 
from the above deliberation where the conditionally dependent value is expressed in terms of |G|/3 by taking 
on half or double this value so that x1 = 2x = 4x2. As mentioned above, this stems from the problematic 
formulation in the original thinking leading up to the paradox. Langan (2000b) offers additional solutions in the 
latter half of his article.  
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One can also formulate the gain in terms of y and end up with the same result
33
. 
 
However, there is one challenge: Although there is a total value for the content of the two 
envelope paradox, no such total value seems to exist for the example with the Siegel paradox. 
The exchange rate case does not necessarily imply a zero sum game as in the case of the two 
envelope paradox
34
. A resolution of both paradoxes must consequently allow for this upper 
boundary to be discarded or described. If it is possible to generalize the solutions, then some 
insight could be gained into the forward exchange discount bias. 
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 First subjective frame: 50 %∙(gain1+gain2) = 50 %∙(-y1+2y1) = y1/2. Second subjective frame: 50 
%∙(gain1+gain2) = 50 %∙(-y+y/2) = -y/4 = -y1/2. The true expectation is then y1/+(-y1/2) = 0 
34
 Langan (2000b) suggests that value and expectation may be relativistic rather than “absolutes”. He explains 
further by among other things introducing Emax =2 Emin instead of a third value which is implicitly used in the 
thinking leading up to the paradox. 
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3 Paradox from the Perspective of Interest Rate Parity 
Siegel’s paradox says that when using JPY as numéraire, then the expected return on 
investments in another currency (like USD) will have a tendency to be higher than the 
expected return on JPY investments. Also, this paradox should hold both ways (giving 
higher return on USD when using JPY as numéraire, and giving higher expected return on 
JPY when using USD as numéraire). 
In Chapter 1, the returns on uncovered USD investments were found to be higher 
(both when using JPY and when USD as numéraire). 
For covered investments, the return on the USD  assets were found to be lower  than 
on similar investment in low risk three-month assets denominated in JPY (both when using 
JPY and when USD as numéraire). 
Since the Siegel paradox implies a tendency of higher expected return in the currency 
which is not used as numéraire, the Siegel paradox does not hold more than one way in the 
aggregated data that we have seen from the US and Japanese financial markets. 
Consequently, Siegel‟s paradox does not seem to give meaningful predictions in the real 
world, unless the distortions caused by the paradox are too small to be visible in the data. 
Assuming that the market provides us with the correct prices that we should try to 
explain, and assuming that the theory may contain errors, it is natural to search in the theory 
for the answer to why the Siegel paradox does not hold. 
It is probable that the forward discount bias that has been observed is caused by for 
instance differences in the liquidity in the various markets, the peso problem (requiring 
compensation to take on risk), settlement rules or tax differences. 
Although the forward discount bias does not hold both ways in the real world, the 
bias which is described in the theory still remains a problem. The reason is that the paradox 
could potentially lead to inefficient distortions in the allocation of capital if investment 
decisions are based on the incorrect reasoning underlying the Siegel paradox. Langan‟s 
resolution of the two-envelope problem may point to ways of resolving the Siegel paradox. 
Edlin (2002) and Bolle (2003) are among those who have tried to link the two 
envelopes problem with the Siegel paradox. Edlin describes the Siegel paradox as being 
richer than the two envelopes problem. The lack of an easily recognizable total value may be 
one such source of richness in the Siegel paradox. 
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By trying to relate the total value |G| (which is used in the two-envelope example) to 
the Siegel paradox, some further insights could possibly be gained. 
An interesting question is whether or not the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
and other models like derivatives models are built on assumptions that include aspects of the 
Siegel paradox. If there are such misguided assumptions in these models, then this could lead 
to discrepancies between the observed data and the predictions made by the models. Such 
shortcomings could lead to distortions in the allocation of capital. This would not necessarily 
be visible in the market prices as a whole (since arbitrage opportunities will eventually be 
discovered and utilized), but possibly for individual investors that follow unsound strategies 
based on these assumptions. Such misallocations of capital made by individual investors 
could also have consequences for the economy as a whole. 
I suggest that further investigation should be made into resolving the Siegel paradox 
as I believe that this could provide new understanding about risk, return and capital 
allocation in the financial markets. 
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Conclusion 
This paper looks into the phenomenon of carry trade, checks returns on investments in low-
risk and low-interest yielding three-month bonds in the US and in Japan, describes the Siegel 
paradox and the two-envelope problem and tries to link the empirical findings with these two 
paradoxes. 
I find that in the period 1993 to 2008, uncovered interest rate parity did not hold for 
three-month Japanese bonds and US bonds. USD investments tended to give higher return in 
the period as a whole, although shorter three-year periods within the period 1993-2008 
showed mixed results. Still, the statistical analysis shows that there is a clear tendency for 
uncovered interest rate parity not to hold, both when using Japanese yen and USD as 
numéraire. 
I find that there was a forward discount bias in the same period. The return on 
covered investments in JPY tended to be higher than on USD. This was the case both for the 
period 1993-2008 as a whole and for shorter three-year periods within this time interval. The 
results are fairly robust statistically.  
When comparing the two-envelopes problem with the Siegel paradox, I find that 
there are similarities between the two, but also an important difference in the sense that the 
two-envelopes problem has a clearly defined total value (the total value of the contents of the 
two envelopes) while the Siegel paradox does not have such a clearly understood total value. 
I think the Siegel paradox is more complex than the two envelopes problem, and if the 
various aspects of the two puzzles are resolved and brought together, this could clarify 
whether forward discount bias is caused by other factors than by the Siegel paradox. 
More research into the puzzles mentioned in this thesis could possibly shed light on 
various models in international finance.
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Appendix – Data Material 
Exchange rate and forward rate 
BoJ BoJ BoJ  
 Interbank rates Spot-forward spread (3 months) Calculated forward rate 
End of Month  in Tokyo (JPY/USD) (negative = discount, at time t-3 for time t  
 T εt positive = premium)  
1992.09 119,25 0,22  
1992.10 123,35 0,04  
1992.11 124,75 -0,08  
1992.12 124,65 0,085  
1993.01 124,3 0,076 123,39 
1993.02 117,85 0,015 124,67 
1993.03 115,35 0,02 124,735 
1993.04 111,1 0,005 124,376 
1993.05 107,45 -0,025 117,865 
1993.06 106,51 -0,013 115,37 
1993.07 105,6 -0,017 111,105 
1993.08 104,18 -0,125 107,425 
1993.09 105,1 -0,228 106,497 
1993.10 108,23 -0,285 105,583 
1993.11 108,82 -0,348 104,055 
1993.12 111,89 -0,37 104,872 
1994.01 109,55 -0,255 107,945 
1994.02 104,3 -0,37 108,472 
1994.03 102,8 -0,425 111,52 
1994.04 102,38 -0,52 109,295 
1994.05 104,38 -0,65 103,93 
1994.06 98,95 -0,663 102,375 
1994.07 99,93 -0,665 101,86 
1994.08 99,57 -0,65 103,73 
1994.09 98,59 -0,786 98,287 
1994.10 97,37 -0,802 99,265 
1994.11 98,98 -0,93 98,92 
1994.12 99,83 -1,015 97,804 
1995.01 98,58 -0,96 96,568 
1995.02 96,93 -0,955 98,05 
1995.03 88,38 -0,985 98,815 
1995.04 83,77 -1,01 97,62 
1995.05 83,19 -1,06 95,975 
1995.06 84,77 -1,023 87,395 
1995.07 88,17 -1,135 82,76 
1995.08 97,46 -1,28 82,13 
1995.09 98,18 -1,407 83,747 
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1995.10 101,9 -1,445 87,035 
1995.11 101,66 -1,375 96,18 
1995.12 102,91 -1,33 96,773 
1996.01 106,92 -1,28 100,455 
1996.02 104,58 -1,22 100,285 
1996.03 106,49 -1,305 101,58 
1996.04 104,29 -1,281 105,64 
1996.05 108,37 -1,365 103,36 
1996.06 109,88 -1,4 105,185 
1996.07 107,13 -1,416 103,009 
1996.08 108,4 -1,373 107,005 
1996.09 111,45 -1,509 108,48 
1996.10 113,27 -1,448 105,714 
1996.11 113,44 -1,423 107,027 
1996.12 115,98 -1,465 109,941 
1997.01 122,13 -1,562 111,822 
1997.02 120,88 -1,545 112,017 
1997.03 123,97 -1,639 114,515 
1997.04 126,92 -1,728 120,568 
1997.05 116,43 -1,543 119,335 
1997.06 114,3 -1,505 122,331 
1997.07 117,74 -1,519 125,192 
1997.08 119,39 -1,535 114,887 
1997.09 121,44 -1,617 112,795 
1997.10 120,29 -1,604 116,221 
1997.11 127,66 -1,83 117,855 
1997.12 129,92 -1,74 119,823 
1998.01 127,34 -1,641 118,686 
1998.02 126,72 -1,628 125,83 
1998.03 133,39 -1,668 128,18 
1998.04 131,95 -1,729 125,699 
1998.05 138,72 -1,826 125,092 
1998.06 139,95 -1,849 131,722 
1998.07 143,79 -1,896 130,221 
1998.08 141,52 -1,84 136,894 
1998.09 135,72 -1,805 138,101 
1998.10 116,09 -1,546 141,894 
1998.11 123,83 -1,588 139,68 
1998.12 115,2 -1,405 133,915 
1999.01 115,98 -1,351 114,544 
1999.02 120,32 -1,465 122,242 
1999.03 119,99 -1,438 113,795 
1999.04 119,59 -1,486 114,629 
1999.05 121,37 -1,53 118,855 
1999.06 120,87 -1,641 118,552 
1999.07 115,27 -1,544 118,104 
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1999.08 110,19 -1,503 119,84 
1999.09 105,66 -1,576 119,229 
1999.10 104,89 -1,566 113,726 
1999.11 102,42 -1,482 108,687 
1999.12 102,08 -1,476 104,084 
2000.01 106,9 -1,572 103,324 
2000.02 110,27 -1,646 100,938 
2000.03 105,29 -1,633 100,604 
2000.04 106,44 -1,716 105,328 
2000.05 107,3 -1,871 108,624 
2000.06 105,4 -1,728 103,657 
2000.07 109,52 -1,798 104,724 
2000.08 106,43 -1,658 105,429 
2000.09 107,75 -1,693 103,672 
2000.10 108,81 -1,7 107,722 
2000.11 111,07 -1,688 104,772 
2000.12 114,9 -1,653 106,057 
2001.01 116,38 -1,406 107,11 
2001.02 116,44 -1,398 109,382 
2001.03 125,27 -1,466 113,247 
2001.04 124,06 -1,304 114,974 
2001.05 119,06 -1,18 115,042 
2001.06 124,27 -1,18 123,804 
2001.07 124,79 -1,126 122,756 
2001.08 118,92 -1,009 117,88 
2001.09 119,29 -0,77 123,09 
2001.10 121,84 -0,664 123,664 
2001.11 123,98 -0,595 117,911 
2001.12 131,47 -0,587 118,52 
2002.01 132,94 -0,606 121,176 
2002.02 133,89 -0,624 123,385 
2002.03 132,71 -0,643 130,883 
2002.04 127,97 -0,606 132,334 
2002.05 123,96 -0,583 133,266 
2002.06 119,22 -0,556 132,067 
2002.07 119,82 -0,565 127,364 
2002.08 117,97 -0,528 123,377 
2002.09 121,79 -0,566 118,664 
2002.10 122,48 -0,503 119,255 
2002.11 122,44 -0,443 117,442 
2002.12 119,37 -0,405 121,224 
2003.01 119,21 -0,397 121,977 
2003.02 117,75 -0,388 121,997 
2003.03 119,02 -0,367 118,965 
2003.04 119,46 -0,393 118,813 
2003.05 118,63 -0,378 117,362 
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2003.06 119,82 -0,353 118,653 
2003.07 120,11 -0,348 119,067 
2003.08 117,13 -0,338 118,252 
2003.09 110,48 -0,348 119,467 
2003.10 108,99 -0,333 119,762 
2003.11 109,34 -0,324 116,792 
2003.12 106,97 -0,305 110,132 
2004.01 105,88 -0,306 108,657 
2004.02 109,08 -0,313 109,016 
2004.03 103,95 -0,293 106,665 
2004.04 110,44 -0,343 105,574 
2004.05 109,56 -0,378 108,767 
2004.06 108,69 -0,456 103,657 
2004.07 111,67 -0,485 110,097 
2004.08 109,86 -0,495 109,182 
2004.09 110,92 -0,564 108,234 
2004.10 105,87 -0,578 111,185 
2004.11 103,17 -0,609 109,365 
2004.12 103,78 -0,655 110,356 
2005.01 103,58 -0,688 105,292 
2005.02 104,58 -0,765 102,561 
2005.03 106,97 -0,833 103,125 
2005.04 105,87 -0,874 102,892 
2005.05 108,17 -0,905 103,815 
2005.06 110,37 -0,981 106,137 
2005.07 112,18 -1,043 104,996 
2005.08 111,42 -1,071 107,265 
2005.09 113,28 -1,153 109,389 
2005.10 115,67 -1,238 111,137 
2005.11 119,46 -1,297 110,349 
2005.12 117,48 -1,306 112,127 
2006.01 117,18 -1,329 114,432 
2006.02 116,35 -1,392 118,163 
2006.03 117,47 -1,448 116,174 
2006.04 114,32 -1,447 115,851 
2006.05 111,85 -1,442 114,958 
2006.06 114,66 -1,485 116,022 
2006.07 114,47 -1,462 112,873 
2006.08 117,23 -1,466 110,408 
2006.09 118,05 -1,483 113,175 
2006.10 117,74 -1,462 113,008 
2006.11 116,12 -1,402 115,764 
2006.12 118,92 -1,402 116,567 
2007.01 121,34 -1,438 116,278 
2007.02 118,59 -1,409 114,718 
2007.03 118,05 -1,372 117,518 
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2007.04 119,41 -1,403 119,902 
2007.05 121,63 -1,424 117,181 
2007.06 123,48 -1,432 116,678 
2007.07 118,99 -1,37 118,007 
2007.08 116,24 -1,413 120,206 
2007.09 115,27 -1,26 122,048 
2007.10 114,78 -1,196 117,62 
2007.11 110,29 -1,171 114,827 
2007.12 113,12 -1,108 114,01 
2008.01 106,63 -0,634 113,584 
2008.02 104,34 -0,551 109,119 
2008.03 99,37 -0,482 112,012 
    
 
Interest Rates 
BoJ BoJ Calculated St. Louis Fed St. Louis Fed Calculated 
End of JPY 3 months JPY 3 months  US treasury bill US treasury bill 
month (t-3) to t (t-3) to t  (t-3) to t (t-3) to t 
t r (annual) 1+r (3 month) Date r* (annual rate) 1+r* (3 month) 
1993.01 3,78 1,009453 1993-02-01 3,13 1,007825 
1993.02 3,84 1,009609 1993-03-01 3,22 1,008050 
1993.03 3,81 1,009531 1993-04-01 3,00 1,007500 
1993.04 3,59 1,008984 1993-05-01 2,93 1,007325 
1993.05 3,31 1,008281 1993-06-01 2,95 1,007375 
1993.06 3,31 1,008281 1993-07-01 2,87 1,007175 
1993.07 3,31 1,008281 1993-08-01 2,96 1,007400 
1993.08 3,28 1,008203 1993-09-01 3,07 1,007675 
1993.09 3,28 1,008203 1993-10-01 3,04 1,007600 
1993.10 3,22 1,008047 1993-11-01 3,02 1,007550 
1993.11 3,00 1,007500 1993-12-01 2,95 1,007375 
1993.12 2,66 1,006641 1994-01-01 3,02 1,007550 
1994.01 2,41 1,006016 1994-02-01 3,10 1,007750 
1994.02 2,25 1,005625 1994-03-01 3,06 1,007650 
1994.03 2,22 1,005547 1994-04-01 2,98 1,007450 
1994.04 2,25 1,005625 1994-05-01 3,25 1,008125 
1994.05 2,28 1,005700 1994-06-01 3,50 1,008750 
1994.06 2,37 1,005925 1994-07-01 3,68 1,009200 
1994.07 2,33 1,005825 1994-08-01 4,14 1,010350 
1994.08 2,15 1,005375 1994-09-01 4,14 1,010350 
1994.09 2,15 1,005375 1994-10-01 4,33 1,010825 
1994.10 2,25 1,005625 1994-11-01 4,48 1,011200 
1994.11 2,37 1,005925 1994-12-01 4,62 1,011550 
1994.12 2,37 1,005925 1995-01-01 4,95 1,012375 
1995.01 2,39 1,005975 1995-02-01 5,29 1,013225 
1995.02 2,39 1,005975 1995-03-01 5,60 1,014000 
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1995.03 2,45 1,006125 1995-04-01 5,71 1,014275 
1995.04 2,38 1,005950 1995-05-01 5,77 1,014425 
1995.05 2,30 1,005750 1995-06-01 5,73 1,014325 
1995.06 1,84 1,004600 1995-07-01 5,65 1,014125 
1995.07 1,39 1,003475 1995-08-01 5,67 1,014175 
1995.08 1,15 1,002875 1995-09-01 5,47 1,013675 
1995.09 1,19 1,002975 1995-10-01 5,42 1,013550 
1995.10 0,85 1,002125 1995-11-01 5,40 1,013500 
1995.11 0,95 1,002375 1995-12-01 5,28 1,013200 
1995.12 0,49 1,001225 1996-01-01 5,28 1,013200 
1996.01 0,64 1,001600 1996-02-01 5,36 1,013400 
1996.02 0,56 1,001400 1996-03-01 5,14 1,012850 
1996.03 0,56 1,001400 1996-04-01 5,00 1,012500 
1996.04 0,58 1,001450 1996-05-01 4,83 1,012075 
1996.05 0,82 1,002050 1996-06-01 4,96 1,012400 
1996.06 0,65 1,001625 1996-07-01 4,95 1,012375 
1996.07 0,70 1,001750 1996-08-01 5,02 1,012550 
1996.08 0,58 1,001450 1996-09-01 5,09 1,012725 
1996.09 0,63 1,001575 1996-10-01 5,15 1,012875 
1996.10 0,82 1,002050 1996-11-01 5,05 1,012625 
1996.11 0,63 1,001575 1996-12-01 5,09 1,012725 
1996.12 0,56 1,001400 1997-01-01 4,99 1,012475 
1997.01 0,53 1,001325 1997-02-01 5,03 1,012575 
1997.02 0,57 1,001425 1997-03-01 4,91 1,012275 
1997.03 0,60 1,001500 1997-04-01 5,03 1,012575 
1997.04 0,54 1,001350 1997-05-01 5,01 1,012525 
1997.05 0,58 1,001450 1997-06-01 5,14 1,012850 
1997.06 0,60 1,001500 1997-07-01 5,16 1,012900 
1997.07 0,58 1,001450 1997-08-01 5,05 1,012625 
1997.08 0,61 1,001525 1997-09-01 4,93 1,012325 
1997.09 0,68 1,001700 1997-10-01 5,05 1,012625 
1997.10 0,67 1,001675 1997-11-01 5,14 1,012850 
1997.11 0,62 1,001550 1997-12-01 4,95 1,012375 
1997.12 0,57 1,001425 1998-01-01 4,97 1,012425 
1998.01 0,56 1,001400 1998-02-01 5,14 1,012850 
1998.02 0,78 1,001950 1998-03-01 5,16 1,012900 
1998.03 1,15 1,002875 1998-04-01 5,04 1,012600 
1998.04 1,15 1,002875 1998-05-01 5,09 1,012725 
1998.05 1,23 1,003075 1998-06-01 5,03 1,012575 
1998.06 0,73 1,001825 1998-07-01 4,95 1,012375 
1998.07 0,63 1,001575 1998-08-01 5,00 1,012500 
1998.08 0,57 1,001425 1998-09-01 4,98 1,012450 
1998.09 0,70 1,001750 1998-10-01 4,96 1,012400 
1998.10 0,80 1,002000 1998-11-01 4,90 1,012250 
1998.11 0,85 1,002125 1998-12-01 4,61 1,011525 
1998.12 0,65 1,001625 1999-01-01 3,96 1,009900 
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1999.01 0,85 1,002125 1999-02-01 4,41 1,011025 
1999.02 0,75 1,001875 1999-03-01 4,39 1,010975 
1999.03 0,62 1,001550 1999-04-01 4,34 1,010850 
1999.04 0,75 1,001875 1999-05-01 4,44 1,011100 
1999.05 0,80 1,002000 1999-06-01 4,44 1,011100 
1999.06 0,38 1,000950 1999-07-01 4,29 1,010725 
1999.07 0,18 1,000450 1999-08-01 4,50 1,011250 
1999.08 0,28 1,000700 1999-09-01 4,57 1,011425 
1999.09 0,08 1,000200 1999-10-01 4,55 1,011375 
1999.10 0,45 1,001125 1999-11-01 4,72 1,011800 
1999.11 0,09 1,000225 1999-12-01 4,68 1,011700 
1999.12 0,20 1,000500 2000-01-01 4,86 1,012150 
2000.01 0,33 1,000825 2000-02-01 5,07 1,012675 
2000.02 0,28 1,000700 2000-03-01 5,20 1,013000 
2000.03 0,60 1,001500 2000-04-01 5,32 1,013300 
2000.04 0,17 1,000425 2000-05-01 5,55 1,013875 
2000.05 0,10 1,000250 2000-06-01 5,69 1,014225 
2000.06 0,61 1,001525 2000-07-01 5,66 1,014150 
2000.07 0,15 1,000375 2000-08-01 5,79 1,014475 
2000.08 0,49 1,001225 2000-09-01 5,69 1,014225 
2000.09 0,11 1,000275 2000-10-01 5,96 1,014900 
2000.10 0,19 1,000475 2000-11-01 6,09 1,015225 
2000.11 0,44 1,001100 2000-12-01 6,00 1,015000 
2000.12 0,41 1,001025 2001-01-01 6,11 1,015275 
2001.01 0,59 1,001475 2001-02-01 6,17 1,015425 
2001.02 0,66 1,001650 2001-03-01 5,77 1,014425 
2001.03 0,68 1,001700 2001-04-01 5,15 1,012875 
2001.04 0,54 1,001350 2001-05-01 4,88 1,012200 
2001.05 0,43 1,001075 2001-06-01 4,42 1,011050 
2001.06 0,26 1,000650 2001-07-01 3,87 1,009675 
2001.07 0,02 1,000050 2001-08-01 3,62 1,009050 
2001.08 0,05 1,000125 2001-09-01 3,49 1,008725 
2001.09 0,08 1,000200 2001-10-01 3,51 1,008775 
2001.10 0,06 1,000150 2001-11-01 3,36 1,008400 
2001.11 0,04 1,000100 2001-12-01 2,64 1,006600 
2001.12 0,06 1,000160 2002-01-01 2,16 1,005400 
2002.01 0,11 1,000275 2002-02-01 1,87 1,004675 
2002.02 0,05 1,000120 2002-03-01 1,69 1,004225 
2002.03 0,07 1,000163 2002-04-01 1,65 1,004125 
2002.04 0,10 1,000250 2002-05-01 1,73 1,004325 
2002.05 0,14 1,000350 2002-06-01 1,79 1,004475 
2002.06 0,18 1,000450 2002-07-01 1,72 1,004300 
2002.07 0,10 1,000250 2002-08-01 1,73 1,004325 
2002.08 0,02 1,000050 2002-09-01 1,70 1,004250 
2002.09 0,08 1,000200 2002-10-01 1,68 1,004200 
2002.10 0,10 1,000250 2002-11-01 1,62 1,004050 
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2002.11 0,08 1,000200 2002-12-01 1,63 1,004075 
2002.12 0,07 1,000178 2003-01-01 1,58 1,003950 
2003.01 0,09 1,000225 2003-02-01 1,23 1,003075 
2003.02 0,09 1,000225 2003-03-01 1,19 1,002975 
2003.03 0,00 0,000000 2003-04-01 1,17 1,002925 
2003.04 0,01 1,000033 2003-05-01 1,17 1,002925 
2003.05 0,00 0,000000 2003-06-01 1,13 1,002825 
2003.06 0,09 1,000223 2003-07-01 1,13 1,002825 
2003.07 0,33 1,000820 2003-08-01 1,07 1,002675 
2003.08 0,33 1,000820 2003-09-01 0,92 1,002300 
2003.09 0,00 0,000000 2003-10-01 0,90 1,002250 
2003.10 0,09 1,000223 2003-11-01 0,95 1,002375 
2003.11 0,34 1,000850 2003-12-01 0,94 1,002350 
2003.12 0,08 1,000200 2004-01-01 0,92 1,002300 
2004.01 0,02 1,000050 2004-02-01 0,93 1,002325 
2004.02 0,21 1,000513 2004-03-01 0,90 1,002250 
2004.03 0,08 1,000198 2004-04-01 0,88 1,002200 
2004.04 0,29 1,000725 2004-05-01 0,93 1,002325 
2004.05 0,00 1,000003 2004-06-01 0,94 1,002350 
2004.06 0,00 0,000000 2004-07-01 0,94 1,002350 
2004.07 0,28 1,000700 2004-08-01 1,02 1,002550 
2004.08 0,02 1,000038 2004-09-01 1,27 1,003175 
2004.09 0,08 1,000198 2004-10-01 1,33 1,003325 
2004.10 0,02 1,000055 2004-11-01 1,48 1,003700 
2004.11 0,09 1,000223 2004-12-01 1,65 1,004125 
2004.12 0,31 1,000775 2005-01-01 1,76 1,004400 
2005.01 0,02 1,000050 2005-02-01 2,07 1,005175 
2005.02 0,09 1,000215 2005-03-01 2,19 1,005475 
2005.03 0,31 1,000775 2005-04-01 2,33 1,005825 
2005.04 0,20 1,000500 2005-05-01 2,54 1,006350 
2005.05 0,10 1,000245 2005-06-01 2,74 1,006850 
2005.06 0,02 1,000050 2005-07-01 2,78 1,006950 
2005.07 0,02 1,000038 2005-08-01 2,84 1,007100 
2005.08 0,03 1,000068 2005-09-01 2,97 1,007425 
2005.09 0,01 1,000025 2005-10-01 3,22 1,008050 
2005.10 0,03 1,000075 2005-11-01 3,44 1,008600 
2005.11 0,03 1,000075 2005-12-01 3,42 1,008550 
2005.12 0,02 1,000050 2006-01-01 3,71 1,009275 
2006.01 0,23 1,000575 2006-02-01 3,88 1,009700 
2006.02 0,03 1,000063 2006-03-01 3,89 1,009725 
2006.03 0,03 1,000063 2006-04-01 4,24 1,010600 
2006.04 0,06 1,000138 2006-05-01 4,43 1,011075 
2006.05 0,06 1,000150 2006-06-01 4,51 1,011275 
2006.06 0,00 0,000000 2006-07-01 4,60 1,011500 
2006.07 0,10 1,000250 2006-08-01 4,72 1,011800 
2006.08 0,30 1,000750 2006-09-01 4,79 1,011975 
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2006.09 0,00 0,000000 2006-10-01 4,95 1,012375 
2006.10 0,42 1,001050 2006-11-01 4,96 1,012400 
2006.11 0,00 0,000000 2006-12-01 4,81 1,012025 
2006.12 0,63 1,001575 2007-01-01 4,92 1,012300 
2007.01 0,35 1,000875 2007-02-01 4,94 1,012350 
2007.02 0,00 0,000000 2007-03-01 4,85 1,012125 
2007.03 0,51 1,001283 2007-04-01 4,98 1,012450 
2007.04 0,55 1,001375 2007-05-01 5,03 1,012575 
2007.05 0,68 1,001700 2007-06-01 4,94 1,012350 
2007.06 0,63 1,001575 2007-07-01 4,87 1,012175 
2007.07 0,62 1,001550 2007-08-01 4,73 1,011825 
2007.08 0,65 1,001625 2007-09-01 4,61 1,011525 
2007.09 0,73 1,001825 2007-10-01 4,82 1,012050 
2007.10 0,75 1,001865 2007-11-01 4,20 1,010500 
2007.11 0,89 1,002213 2007-12-01 3,89 1,009725 
2007.12 0,70 1,001750 2008-01-01 3,90 1,009750 
2008.01 0,87 1,002175 2008-02-01 3,27 1,008175 
2008.02 0,93 1,002325 2008-03-01 3,00 1,007500 
2008.03 0,73 1,001825 2008-04-01 2,75 1,006875 
 
 
